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CIVIL RICO: A CALL FOR A UNIFORM
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
I. Introduction
Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (OCCA),'
entitled Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO),2
provides criminal sanctions,3 a public civil remedy, 4 and a private
1. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23 (1970).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
3. Section 1963 provides:
(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall
be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty
years, or both, and shall forfeit to the United States (1) any interest he
has acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962, and (2) any
interest in, security of, claim against, or property or contractual right
of any kind affording a source of influence over, any enterprise which
he has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in
the conduct of, in violation of section 1962. (b) In any action brought
by the United States under this section, the district courts of the United
States shall have jurisdiction to enter such restraining orders or prohi-
bitions, or to take such other actions, including, but not limited to, the
acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, in connection with any
property or other interest subject to forfeiture under this section, as it
shall deem proper. (c) Upon conviction of a person under this section,
the court shall authorize the Attorney General to seize all property or
other interest declared forfeited under this section upon such terms and
conditions as the court shall deem proper. If a property right or other
interest is not exercisable or transferable for value by the United States,
it shall expire, and shall not revert to the convicted person. All provisions
of law relating to the disposition of property; or the proceeds from the
sale thereof, or the remission or mitigation of forfeitures for violation
of the customs laws, and the compromise of claims and the award of
compensation to informers in respect of such forfeitures shall apply to
forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, under the provisions
of this section, insofar as applicable and not inconsistent with the pro-
visions hereof. Such duties as are imposed upon the collector of customs
or any other person with respect to the disposition of property under
the customs laws shall be performed under this chapter by the Attorney
General. The United States shall dispose of all such property as soon
as commercially feasible, making due provision for the rights of innocent
persons.
18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982).
4. Section 1964 provides in pertinent part:
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to
prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing
appropriate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person
to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise;
imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments
of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from
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civil remedy.' RICO was designed to help thwart organized crime. 6
Beginning in early 1981, however, private plaintiffs discovered that
if RICO's statutory language is given a broad reading, a civil RICO
claim' may be joined in nearly any fraud action including those
against so-called "legitimate" defendants.' As the frequency of civil
RICO litigation against these defendants has grown, many courts
engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the
activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering
dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision for
the rights of innocent persons. (b) The Attorney General may institute
proceedings under this section. In any action brought by the United
States under this section, the court shall proceed as soon as practicable
to the hearing and determination thereof. Pending final determination
thereof, the court may at any time enter such restraining orders or
prohibitions, or take such other actions, including the acceptance of
satisfactory performance bonds, as it shall deem proper .... (d) A finaljudgment or decree rendered in favor of the United States in any criminal
proceeding brought by the United States under this chapter shall estop
the defendant from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense
in any subsequent civil proceeding brought by the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(a)-(b), (d) (1982).
5. Section 1964(c) of RICO, provides in pertinent part:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation
of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate
United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he
sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
6. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (Statement of Findings and Purpose).
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime
in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-
gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing
enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities
of those engaged in organized crime.
Id. See generally 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4007-91.
7. In this Note, "civil RICO" refers to private causes of action brought under
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
8. These "legitimate" defendants, which have been characterized as "racket-
eers" for purposes of civil RICO actions, include: Lloyd's of London, Bear Stearns
& Co., Merrill Lynch, Shearson/American Express, and E.F. Hutton & Co. See
Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Austin v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 667 (W.D. Mich. 1983); Mauriber
v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Hokama
v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Barker v. Underwriters
at Lloyd's London, 564 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Mich. 1983); see also Sedima, S.P.R.L.
v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 487 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506
(U.S. Jan. 15, 1985) (No. 84-648).
As one commentary has suggested, "RICO threatens to become the most powerful
weapon that a plaintiff may use against such [legitimate] corporate defendants."
Skinner & Tone, Civil RICO and the Corporate Defendant, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 30,
1984, at 22, col. 3; see Noble, Re-Examining Rackets Law, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4,
1984, at D2, col. 1.
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have suggested that this use of RICO is contrary to the intent of
the Congress which enacted it. 9 Two areas of confusion have arisen.
First, many courts have applied four substantive restrictions' ° on
the availability of civil RICO. The first restriction requires the
plaintiff to allege that the defendant has a connection to organized
crime." The second limits standing to plaintiffs who allege a par-
ticular type of "injury."' ' 2 The third restriction requires the plaintiff
to allege an enterprise distinct from the pattern of racketeering or
distinct from the defendant. 3 Finally, a few courts, notably the
second circuit, have permitted civil RICO actions only in instances
9. See infra notes 57-104 and accompanying text; e.g., Sedima, 741 F.2d at
496-504 (requiring prior conviction); Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp.
636, 643 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (requiring connection to organized crime); North Bar-
rington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (requiring
"competitive" injury); Waste Recovery Corp. v. Mahler, 566 F. Supp. 1466, 1468-
69 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (requiring "racketeering" injury); Barker v. Underwriters at
Lloyd's London, 564 F. Supp. 352, 357 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (requiring distinct
enterprise).
10. See infra notes 63-104 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
different restrictions which courts have applied to civil RICO claims.
For a discussion of civil RICO, see generally Blakey, RICO Civil Fraud Action
in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237 (1982);
Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic
Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMPLE L.Q. 1009 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Basic Concepts]; Bradley, Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts: An Analysis
of RICO, 65 IOWA L. REV. 837 (1980); Bridges, Private RICO Litigation Based
upon "Fraud in the Sale of Securities," 18 GA. L. REV. 43 (1983); Campbell,
Civil RICO Actions in Commercial Litigation: Racketeer or Businessman?, 36 Sw.
L.J. 925 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Commercial Litigation]; Dzivi, Civil RICO:
Pleading Fraud for Treble Damages, 45 MONT. L. REV. 87 (1984) [hereinafter cited
as Pleading Fraud]; Macintosh, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act: Powerful New Tool of the Defrauded Securities Plaintiff, 31 U. KAN. L.
REV. 7 (1982); Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 291 (1983); Wexler, Civil
RICO Comes of Age: Some Maturational Problems and Proposals for Reform, 35
RUTGERS L. REV. 285 (1983); Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety
of Judicial Restriction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1101 (1982); Note, Civil RICO and
"Garden Variety" Fraud-A Suggested Analysis, 58 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 93 (1983);
Note, Putting A Halt To Judicial Limitations on Civil RICO, 52 UMKC L. REV.
56 (1983).
11. See, e.g., Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636 (C.D. Cal.
1983). See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
12. See, e.g., North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207 (N.D.
Ill. 1980) (requiring "competitive injury"); Waste Recovery Corp. v. Mahler, 566
F. Supp. 1466 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (requiring "racketeering enterprise" injury). See
infra notes 76-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
13. See, e.g., Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 104
S. Ct. 527 (1983) (enterprise distinct from defendant); Barker v. Underwriters at
Lloyd's London, 564 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (enterprise distinct from
pattern of racketeering activity). See infra notes 86-94 and accompanying text for
a discussion of these cases.
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in which the defendants previously have been convicted of the pred-
icate acts alleged in the civil complaint.14 These four restrictions
have left civil RICO litigation in a state of confusion. 5
The second area of confusion, which to date has produced in-
consistent results, concerns the statute of limitations which applies
to a civil RICO claim. 16 Unlike some federal statutory causes of
action, RICO does not contain an express statute of limitations.' 7
Thus far, courts deciding the timeliness of civil RICO actions have
followed the Supreme Court's rule for determining the statute of
limitations for federal causes of action without an express period.'
According to that rule, the forum state's limitations period for an
analogous cause of action is generally-though not always-to be
applied. 9 Consideration of those cases which have applied the ex-
ception to the Supreme Court rule, however, suggests that the un-
animity achieved thus far in the application of statutes of limitations
to civil RICO actions might not be permanent. This Note proposes
that analogous state limitations periods should not be applied and
that Congress should resolve the confusion by enacting an express
statute of limitations. Alternatively, in the absence of congressional
action, courts should look to those cases which have adopted the
exception to the Supreme Court rule and apply an analogous federal
limitations period to civil RICO claims.20
In reaching this conclusion, the Note reviews RICO2' and its
history," with emphasis on decisions which have considered the
statute of limitations to be applied in civil RICO actions.23 This
Note suggests that because the Supreme Court's general rule24 is
14. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984),
cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985) (No. 84-648). See infra notes
95-102 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
15. Courts around the country are divided in their application of civil RICO.
For a discussion of this division, see infra notes 57-104 and accompanying text.
16. Courts have taken different approaches when considering statute of limi-
tations problems in civil RICO actions. See infra notes 133-77 and accompanying
text for a discussion of these approaches.
17. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
18. See infra notes 109-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme
Court's rule of applying the forum state's statute of limitations to federal causes
of action which do not contain express statutes of limitations.
19. See infra notes 117-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases in
which the Supreme Court has looked to an analogous federal statute of limitations.
20. See infra notes 178-207 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 27-41 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 42-56 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 133-77 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
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inconsistent with RICO's history and purpose, it should not be
applied.25 The Note concludes that Congress could avoid the confu-
sion by enacting a statute of limitations which would provide uniform-
ity and predictability in civil RICO actions.2 6
II. The Statute
A. Statutory Language
Section 196127 sets forth violations, known as "predicate acts," '2
which are characterized as "racketeering activity." ' 29 Various state
and federal violations are included,30 and section 1961 provides that
25. See infra notes 167-86 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 178-207 and accompanying text.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982).
28. The term "predicate act" is used by the courts to describe those violations
which are included in Section 1961, any two of which form the basis of a RICO
claim.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982).
30. Section 1961(1) provides:
(l)"racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder,
kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in
narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law
and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act
which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18,
United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating
to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting),
section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable
under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement
from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate
credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling
information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating
to wire fraud), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section
1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511
(relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section
1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion),
section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate
transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to un-
lawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition
of illegal gambling businesses), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to in-
terstate transportation of stolen property), sections 2341-2346 (relating
to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white
slave traffic); (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States
Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to
labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from
union funds); or (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case
under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture,
importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing
in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the
United States.
210 FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL [Vol. XIII
the commission of any two or more predicate acts within a ten-
year period establishes a "pattern of racketeering activity."'" Section
196232 prohibits any person from: (1) investing any income received
from a pattern of racketeering activity in an enterprise engaged in
interstate commerce;3 3 (2) acquiring any interest in or control of an
enterprise engaged in interstate commerce through a pattern of rack-
eteering activity;3" (3) participating, while employed by an enterprise
engaged in interstate commerce, in the enterprise's affairs through
a pattern of racketeering actity;3 5 and (4) conspiring to commit any
of these acts.
36
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982). Section 1961(5) provides: (5) " 'pattern of
racketeering activity' requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which
occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred
within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of
a prior act of racketeering activity." Id.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982). Section 1962 provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has par-
ticipated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United
States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such
income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest
in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged
in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A
purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment,
and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control
of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful
under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser,
the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in
any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt
after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of
the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in
law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering
activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain,
directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which
is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in
the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the
provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
Id.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982). See supra note 32 for text of section 1962(a).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982). See supra note 32 for text of section 1962(b).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982). See supra note 32 for text of section 1962(c).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1982). See supra note 32 for text of section 1962(d).
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In addition to RICO's criminal and public civil remedies, section
196411 authorizes a private civil action by a person who is injured
in his business or property "by reason of a violation of section
1962."38 The injured plaintiff may sue for treble damages39 and a
reasonable attorney's fee. 4° Despite its explicit nature, RICO does
not contain an express statute of limitations provision applicable to
the criminal sanctions or either of the civil remedies.
41
B. Legislative History
Before enacting RICO, Congress considered various factors sur-
rounding organized crime and the need to strengthen the criminal
prohibitions and civil remedies against its activities. 42 RICO's in-
corporation in the OCCA occurred virtually without dissent. 43 How-
ever, a group of Congressmen," echoing testimony before the House
and Senate Committees, 45 did criticize various titles of the OCCA,
including RICO. 46 Foreseeing the problems which have resulted in
recent years from the application of RICO's apparently broad sta-
tutory language, 7 these critics warned that RICO was poorly drafted 8
and that its broad language made it ripe for abuse. 49
The criminal penalties did not distinguish between members of
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). See supra note 5 for text of section 1964(c).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
42. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23 (1970) (Statement of Findings and
Purpose).
43. For Senate vote, see 166 CONG. REC. 972 (Yeas-73, Nays-I, Not voting-
26). For House vote, see 116 CONG. REc. 35,363 (Yeas-341, Nays-26, Not voting-
63).
44. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 1970 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4076-91 (Dissenting views of Representatives John
Conyers, Jr., Abner Mikva, and William F. Ryan); see also S. REP. No. 617, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 215 (1969) (Views of Senators Philip A. Hart and Edward M.
Kennedy).
45. Representatives Conyers, Mikva, and Ryan warned, in their statements to
the House Judiciary Committee, that RICO was "pregnant with the potential for
abuse." See 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4081. Senators Hart and Kennedy
warned, in their statements to the Senate Judiciary Committee, that "the reach of
[the OCCA] goes beyond organized criminal activity. Most of its features propose
substantial changes in the general body of criminal procedure." See S. REP. No.
617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 215 (1969).
46. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 1970 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4081.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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organized crime and ordinary defendants.50 Moreover, civil RICO
could be applied against "legitimate" businesses.5 The dissenting
legislators urged that RICO not be enacted because, "[i]t both fails
to do effectively what it sets out to do and succeeds in doing far
too much what it should not do." ' 52 Despite these predictions, RICO
passed both Houses by wide margins and was signed into law as
Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act.53
During its discussions of RICO, the House had the opportunity
to include a statute of limitations' 4 and the Senate heard a proposal
to amend RICO to include a statute of limitations." However, the
amendment never became part of the bill and was not enacted.16
III. Problems with Statutory Interpretation
Courts have graploled with RICO's civil remedies and their potential
application to so-called "legitimate" defendants.57 A literal reading
of the statutory language suggests that the commission of any two
predicate acts5" within a ten-year period constitutes a "pattern of
racketeering activity" 59 and makes the violator liable for treble
damages. 60 Courts have recognized civil RICO's potential for fed-
eralizing common law fraud actions6I and have taken different
approaches62 when confronted with complaints which seem to raise
this potential.
Some courts have refused to recognize any restrictions on what
they find to be the plain language of RICO, 63 and, upon the allegation
50. Id. at 4083.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 4084.
53. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 116 CONG. REC. 37,264 (1970). See supra note 43 for
the House and Senate vote.
54. See 116 CONG. REC. 35,346 (1970) (proposed floor amendment of Rep.
Steiger); 116 CONG. REC. 31,914 (1970) (H.R. 19215-Representative Poff proposed
a five-year statute of limitations).
55. 118 CONG. REC. 29,615 (1972) (Senators McClellan and Hruska's proposed
amendment included statute of limitations; House never considered this amendment).
56. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
57. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d at 487; see also Noble,
Re-Examining Rackets Law, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1984, at D2, col. 1; Skinner &
Tone, Civil RICO and the Corporate Defendant, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 30, 1984, at 28,
col. 1.
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982). See supra note 30 for text of section 1961(1).
59. 18 U.S.C, § 1961(5) (1982). See supra note 31 for text of section 1961(5).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). See supra note 5 for text of section 1964(c).
61. See, e.g., Sedima, 741 F.2d at 486; see also Brodsky, RICO, N.Y.L.J.,
Feb. 15, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
62. See infra notes 63-102 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1358 (7th Cir, 1983); see also
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that the defendant committed at least two predicate acts," ' have
permitted civil RICO actions to proceed beyond the pleading stage. 6
For example, in Schacht v. Brown,66 the court considered a civil
RICO claim based on fraud in the insurance industry. 67 In Schacht,
the court rejected the application of any restrictions to RICO's
express language. 68 The Schacht court recognized the restrictions
which other courts had applied to civil RICO claims6I but expressly
rejected them.70
Other courts have held that only defendants who have a nexus
to organized crime may be reached under civil RICO. 7l In Hokama
v. E. F. Hutton & Co.,72 for example, the court considered a civil
RICO claim based on alleged securities law violations. 71 Considering
the defendants' motion to dismiss, the court held that the civil RICO
claim must fail because the "plaintiffs must allege some link to
organized crime, however defined. ' 74 The court recognized that prov-
ing an organized crime nexus would be difficult but reasoned that
a connection to organized crime was necessary to prevent civil RICO's
application to causes of action which already provide other remedies. 75
B. F. Hirsch v. Enright Bros. Co., 577 F. Supp. 339 (D.N.J. 1983); Kimmel v.
Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982). See supra note 30 for text of section 1961(1).
65. To date, only one case has proceeded to a judgment for plaintiff after
trial. See B. F. Hirsch v. Enright Bros. Co., 577 F. Supp. 339 (D.N.J. 1983).
In Enright, the court considered a civil RICO claim based on alleged breach of
contract and fraudulent misrepresentation. The court gave a broad reading to RICO
and awarded treble damages and a reasonable attorney's fee. Id.; see also Brodsky,
RICO, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 15, 1984, at 1.
66. 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1983).
67. Id. at 1345-46.
68. Id. at 1359.
69. See generally id. at 1353-59.
70. Id. at 1359.
71. See, e.g., Hokama v. E.F, Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636, 643 (C.D.
Cal. 1983); Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 256,
260 (E.D. La. 1981); Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 747
(N.D. I11. 1981); Noonan v. Granville-Smith, 537 F. Supp. 23, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
But see Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 21 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied
sub nor. Moss v. Newman, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984); Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United
Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1287 n.6 (7th Cir. 1983); Schacht v. Brown,
711 F.2d 1343, 1356 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Arthur Andersen & Co. v.
Schmidt, 104 S. Ct. 508 (1983); Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express,. Inc., 567
F. Supp. 1231, 1239 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Noland v. Gurley, 566 F, Supp. 210, 217
(D. Colo. 1983).
72. 566 F. Supp. 636 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
73. Id. at 640.
74. Id. at 643.
75. Id. These other remedies include the various statutory and common law
violations set forth in section 1961(1) as "racketeering activity." See supra note
30 for test of section 1961(1).
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Some courts have required civil RICO plaintiffs to allege a par-
ticular type of injury. While some courts have held that a plaintiff
must plead a "competitive" injury, 6 others have required a "rack-
eteering enterprise" injury.77 In North Barrington Development, Inc.
v. Fanslow, 7 the court considered a civil RICO action based on
alleged fraud in a real estate development project. 79 The court dis-
missed the civil RICO count finding that the plaintiff had failed to
allege some type of injury to his business or property.80 In holding
that civil RICO required some type of "competitive" injury, the
court noted that "the purpose of [section] 1964(c) was not to transform
state law violations into federal violations, but to prevent interference
with free competition." 81
In Waste Recovery Corp. v. Mahler,82 the court considered a civil
RICO claim based on fraud in the sale of certain waste oil refineries.83
In dismissing the plaintiffs' civil RICO action, the court held that
although the businesses in question may have been operated as a
"racketeering enterprise, 8 4 the plaintiff had failed to establish that
the injury suffered was proximately caused by the sale of these
businesses.85
76. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235, 1241 (S.D.N.Y.
1983), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d
511 (2d Cir. 1984); North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207,
211 (N.D. I11. 1980). But see Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc.,
713 F.2d 1272, 1288 (7th Cir. 1983); Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1358 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Schmidt, 104 S. Ct. 508
(1983); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1059 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd in part, 710
F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.
v. Bennett, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983).Recently, a Second Circuit opinion, although affirming a district court opinion
which required the allegation of a "competitive injury," held that the injury need
not be "competitive," but must be some type of "proprietary injury." See Bankers
Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 516 n.6 (2d Cir. 1984).
77. See Waste Recovery Corp. v. Mahler, 566 F. Supp. 1466, 1468-69 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 564 F. Supp. 352, 358 (E.D.
Mich. 1983); Johnson v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281, 285 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Harper
v. New Japan Secs. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Landmark
Sav. & Loan v. Loeb Rhoades, Hornblower & Co., 527 F. Supp. 206, 208-09
(E.D. Mich. 1981). But see Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 567 F.
Supp. at 1240; Windsor Associates, Inc. v. Greenfeld, 564 F. Supp. at 278-79.
78. 547 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. I11. 1980).
79. Id. at 208.
80. Id. at 211.
81. Id. at 210.
82. 566 F. Supp. 1466 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
83. Id. at 1467-68.
84. Id. at 1469.
85. Id.
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Still other courts have required that a plaintiff allege the existence
of an enterprise distinct from the pattern of racketeering activity 6
or distinct from the defendants. 7 In Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's
London,8 the court considered a civil RICO claim based on alle-
gations of mail fraud in the failure to pay insurance claims for
certain fire losses.89 In dismissing the civil RICO claim, the court
found that the plaintiffs had failed to "assert an enterprise with a
separate economic existence from the alleged pattern of racketeer-
ing." 90 In Bennett v. Berg,91 the court considered a civil RICO claim
based on common law fraud in the operation of a retirement village. 92
In dismissing the civil RICO claim, the court held that the complaint
failed to allege an enterprise distinct from the defendants. 93 In
Bennett, the plaintiff simply failed to allege an "enterprise" which
was distinct "from the 'person' who 'associated with' an enterprise
for purposes of racketeering.''94
Finally, the second circuit recently has held that a plaintiff may
maintain a civil RICO action only where the defendant previously
has been convicted of the underlying predicate acts. 95 In Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,96 the court considered a civil RICO claim
based on fraud in the operation of an exporting business. 97 The
court held that the plaintiff must allege not only a "racketeering
injury," 98 but also that the defendant previously had been convicted
86. See Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 564 F. Supp. 352, 357 (E.D.
Mich. 1983); see also Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1059-61 (8th Cir. 1982);
Moss v. Morgan Stanley, 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1360 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other
grounds, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983).
87. See Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d at 1061-62; see also Barker v. Underwriters
at Lloyd's London, 564 F. Supp. 352, 357 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Parnes v. Heinold
Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 24 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Van Schaick v. Church
of Scientology of Calif., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1137 (D. Mass. 1982).
88. 564 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
89. Id. at 354.
90. Id. at 357.
91. 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982).
92. Id. at 1056-57.
93. Id. at 1061-62.
94. Id. at 1061.
95. See Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Flaherty, A RICO Crisis, Nat'l
L.J., Aug. 13, 1984, at 1, col. 3; LaRossa & Mitchell, 'Mother of Mercy, Is This
The End of RICO?', N.Y.L.J., Aug. 13, 1984, at 1, col. 3. But see Haroco v.
Am. Nat'l Bank, 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), cert granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506
(U.S. Jan. 15, 1985) (No. 84-822).
96. 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), cert granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan.
15, 1985) (No. 84-648).
97. Id. at 484-85.
98. Id. at 495-96.
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of the underlying predicate acts.99 The Sedima court echoed others
when it stated that it was not Congress' intent to permit a treble
damages recovery for anyone injured by the underlying predicate
acts.' °° Accordingly, to bring a civil RICO action, "there must be
a 'violation,' that is, criminal convictions on the underlying predicate
offenses."'' 1 This requirement has been followed in subsequent cases
decided by the second circuit.' 2
Generally, courts applying one or more of these four substantive
restrictions have noted the explosion of civil RICO litigation and
the need to curb what they perceive to be is its abuse. 103 Given the
conflicts among the circuits, the Supreme Court has decided to hear
the issue. 104
99. Id. at 496.
100. Id. at 503.
101. Id.
102. The Sedima decision was followed by two other Second Circuit civil RICO
cases decided by different panels. The day after Sedima was handed down, in
Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984), the court affirmed
a district court's dismissal of a civil RICO claim holding that the plaintiff had
failed to allege "proprietary injury." Id. at 516. The court noted Sedima, but
specifically did not reach the question of whether an actionable civil RICO claim
required the prior conviction of the predicate offenses. Id. at 516 n.5.
The following day, a different panel of the Second Circuit upheld the requirement
of prior convictions of the predicate offenses in Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524
(2d Cir. 1984). The Furman court's opinion strongly disagreed with the Circuit's
position as set forth in Sedima, but held that the case was controlling. Id. at 525.
A recent District of Columbia court adopted the Sedima holding; see Berg v.
First Am. Bankshares, Inc. [Current Binder], FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,826,
at 90,162 (D:D.C. Oct. 19, 1984).
For a discussion of the Second Circuit cases and their effect on civil RICO
decisions, see Flaherty, A RICO Crisis, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 13, 1984, at 1, col. 3;
LaRossa & Mitchell, 'Mother of Mercy, Is This The End of RICO?', N.Y.L.J.,
Aug. 13, 1984, at 1, col. 4. Most recently, the Second Circuit limited the application
of the Sedima requirement of a prior conviction of the underlying predicate acts.
In Durante Bros. & Sons v. Flushing Nat'l Bank, No. 84-7221, slip op. at 1721
(2d Cir. Feb. 5, 1985), the court refused to apply the prior conviction requirement
to a civil RICO claim based on the collection of an unlawful debt. Id. at 1738.
103. See, e.g., Sedima, 741 F.2d at 486-88.
104. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co., cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S.
Jan. 15, 1985) (No. 84-648); American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, cert.
granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1985) (No. 84-822); see also Greenhouse,
Court to Rule on Private RICO Suits, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1985, at D5, col. 1;
Lauter, High Court Accepts Two Civil RICO Appeals, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 28, 1985,
at 5, col. 1; Wiermiel, Justices to Consider Business Lawsuits Brought Under Anti-
Racketeering Act, Wall St. J., Jan. 15, 1985, at 10, col. 1; Justices to Decide
Issue of Damages in RICO Cases, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 15, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
The Supreme Court has considered RICO. In United States v. Turkette, 452
U.S. 576 (1981), the Court held that RICO applied to legitimate as well as illegitimate
enterprises. The Court stressed that RICO must be " 'liberally construed to effectuate
its remedial purposes.' " Id. at 587 (quoting Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
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IV. Statute of Limitations
RICO does not include an express statute of limitations.S To
date, courts considering the limitations question in civil RICO actions
have applied the limitations period for an analogous action under
the law of the forum state. 1°6 These courts have thus followed a
line of Supreme Court decisions holding that where a federal civil
cause of action contains no express statute of limitations, courts
generally should apply the limitations period for the most closely
analogous state cause of action. 07 The Supreme Court has also held,
however, that a court should not blindly apply a state limitations
period when application would be contrary to the policy behind the
federal statute. 08
A. The Supreme Court's General Rule
The Supreme Court has long held that where a federal statute
fails to include an express statute of limitations, courts generally
should look to the law of the forum state for the applicable lim-
Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970)); see also Russello v. United
States, 104 S. Ct. 296 (1983) (insurance proceeds held to constitute "interest"
within meaning of forfeiture provision of RICO).
105. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
106. See Compton v. Ide, 732 F.2d 1429, 1433 (9th Cir. 1984); Alexander v.
Perkin Elmer Corp., 729 F.2d 576, 577 (8th Cir. 1984); Nelson v. Chapman &
Cutler, [Current Binder], FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) j 91,808, at 90,077 (N.D. Ill.
July 12, 1984); Victoria Oil Co. v. Lancaster Corp., 587 F. Supp. 429, 431-32 (D.
Colo. 1984); Teltronics Servs., Inc. v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 724,
733 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Burns v. Ersek, 591 F. Supp. 837, 843 (D. Minn. 1984);
Estee Lauder, Inc. v. Harco Graphics, Inc., No. 82 Civ. 8188 (S.D.N.Y. March
21, 1984) (available Sept. 2, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Umstead
v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 342, 347-48 (M.D.N.C. 1984); Creamer
v. General Teamsters Local Union 326, 579 F. Supp. 1284, 1289 (D. Del. 1984);
Seawell v. Miller Brewing Co., 576 F. Supp. 424, 427 (M.D.N.C. 1983); Kirschner
v. Cable/Tel Corp., 576 F. Supp. 234, 241 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Durante Bros. & Sons
v. Flushing Nat'l Bank, No. 84-7221, slip op. at 1721 (2d Cir. Feb. 5, 1985);
Noland v. Gurley, 566 F. Supp. 210, 216 (D. Colo. 1983); Eisenberg v. Gagnon,
564 F. Supp. 1347, 1354 (E.D. Pa. 1983); D'Iorio v. Adonizio, 554 F. Supp. 222,
231-32 (M.D. Pa. 1982); Gilbert v. Bagley, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 99,483, at 96,795-96 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 17, 1982); State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 683-84 (N.D. Ind. 1982); Willcutts
v. Jefferson Trust & Savs. Bank of Peoria, No. 84-2006 (C.D. 11. April 21, 1982)
(available Sept. 2, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Ingram Corp. v.
J. Ray McDermott & Co., 495 F. Supp. 1321, 1324 n.4 (E.D. La. 1980).
107. See infra notes 109-16 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
borrowing of statutes of limitations in federal actions, see Note, Limitation Bor-
rowing in Federal Courts, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1127 (1979).
108. See infra notes 117-32 and accompanying text.
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itations period. 0 9 In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 1o
the petitioner sued his employer and union in a Tennessee federal
district court for alleged employment discrimination."' The Court
held that Tennessee's one-year statute of limitations period for sta-
tutory penalties" 2 barred that portion of the discrimination action
brought under section 1981. 13 The Court reasoned that although
any limitations period is "necessarily arbitrary, ' ' l1 4 the time period
selected reflects the state's judgment of the point at which the interests
in prohibiting stale claims outweighs the interests in bringing valid
claims." 5 This rationale has been followed by the Court in subsequent
cases. 116
109. See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1980) (Civil Rights
Act of 1871); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977) (Civil
Rights Act of 1964); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462
(1975); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703-04 (1966) (§ 301 of
Labor Management Relations Act); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City
of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 397 (1906) (Sherman Antitrust Act); McCluny v. Silliman,
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270, 277 (1830).
110. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
111. Petitioner, a black employee of defendant shipping company, filed a com-
plaint with the E.E.O.C. charging defendant with employment discrimination. After
more than two years, the E.E.O.C. completed its investigation and issued a right
to sue letter. In his subsequent suit, petitioner added a charge of discrimination
based on 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Id. at 455-57. Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of
all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
112. TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104 (1980). Section 28-3-104(a) provides:
Actions for libel, for injuries to the person, false imprisonment, malicious
prosecution, criminal conversation, seduction, breach of marriage promise,
actions and suits against attorneys for malpractice whether said actions
are grounded or based in contract or tort, civil actions for compensatory
or punitive damages, or both, brought under the federal civil rights
statutes, and actions for statutory penalities shall be commenced within
one (1) year after the cause of action accrued.
Id.
113. The court found that the E.E.O.C.'s administrative remedy and the federal
statutory remedy (under Section 1981) were "truly independent." 421 U.S. at 466.
Thus, the statute of limitations for the section 1981 action was not tolled by the
filing of petitioner's complaint with the E.E.O.C. Moreover, the court could find
no reason to excuse petitioner's failure to take the precautions necessary to preserve
his claim by filing his Section 1981 action in a timely manner. Id. at 465-67. In
short, petitioner had "slept on his § 1981 rights." Id. at 466.
114. Id. at 463.
115. Id. at 463-64.
116. See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 485 (1980); see also
DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 103 S. Ct. 2281 (1983).
CIVIL RICO
The Supreme Court has consistently held, however, that state
limitations periods should not be "mechanically applied"" 7 to federal
actions where a limitations period is absent in the federal statute." 8
In Occidental Life v. EEOC,"19 the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) sued Occidental for alleged violations of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.120 The Court rejected the
petitioner's argument that the forum state's statute of limitations
should be applied.' 2 ' Although acknowledging its general rule, 2 2 the
Court reasoned that state law is not to be the exclusive guide in
questions regarding federal statutes which do not contain express
statutes of limitations. 3 "State legislatures do not devise their lim-
itations periods with national interests in mind, and it is the duty
of the federal courts to assure that the importation of state law will
not frustrate or interfere with the implementation of national pol-
icies.' 24 Accordingly, the Court held that state limitations periods
should not be applied in federal statutory actions if their application
is "inconsistent" with the statute's underlying policy. 2 The Court
determined that Congress did not intend that state limitations periods
restrict the ability of the EEOC to file federal enforcement actions. 2 6
Recently, in DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teams-
ters,2 7 the Court, although reaffirming its position concerning the
application of state limitations periods to federal statutory actions,
applied an analogous federal limitations period to the federal sta-
117. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977).
118. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 103 S. Ct. at 2289;
Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. at 367; Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 465 (1977); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383
U.S. 696, 704 (1966).
119. 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
120. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat.
103 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
In Occidental Life, an employee of petitioner's company had filed a complaint
with the E.E.O.C. charging the company with sex discrimination. After approxi-
mately three and one-half years, subsequent to the failure of conciliation efforts
by the E.E.O.C., the E.E.O.C. brought this enforcement action. 432 U.S. at 357-
58.
121. Id. at 368-69. Specifically, petitioners argued that California's one-year
statute of limitations (see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340(3) (West 1982)), should be
applied to the E.E.O.C.'s action. 432 U.S. at 358.
122. See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
123. 432 U.S. at 367.
124. Id.
125. Id., citing Johnson, 421 U.S. at 465; see also Hoosier, 383 U.S. at 706-
07.
126. 432 U.S. at 369-72.
127. 103 S. Ct. 2281 (1983).
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tutory claim.'28 DelCostello involved two separate claims brought by
employees against their employer and their union under section 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act.1 29 In determining the ap-
propriate limitations period, the Court rejected the shorter state
limitations periods and adopted the longer period for claims brought
under section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act. 30 Adopting
the analogous federal provision, the Court stated that "resort to
state law remains the norm for borrowing of limitations periods."''
The Court stressed, however, that the rule was not applicable in all
circumstances.
[Wihen a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a
closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the federal
policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make the rule
a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking,
[the Court has] not hesitated to turn away from state law.,'3
B. Application of the General Rule in Civil RICO Litigation
1. Looking to the Predicate Acts
Courts which have considered statute of limitations problems in
civil RICO cases have followed the general Supreme Court rule and
applied the limitations period for the analogous state cause of ac-
tion. "'33 In so doing, the majority of courts have looked to the
128. 103 S. Ct. at 2293. The Court applied an analogous limitations period,
section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)
(1982).
129. 103 S. Ct. at 2285-87. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
130. 103 S. Ct. at 2293-94. The Court rejected the application of a 30-day
Maryland statute and a 90-day New York statute, both state-established limitations
periods for the vacation of arbitration awards. Id. at 2286. Instead, the Court
adopted a uniform 6-month period, under section 10(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, for the bringing of unfair labor practice charges. Id. at 2293-94.
The Court reasoned that section 10(b) accomodated a "balance of interests" similar
to that at stake in the case before it. Id.
131. Id. at 2294.
132. Id. For a discussion of the DelCostello decision, see Note, A New Federal
Statute of Limitations for Section 301/Fair Representations Claims: Should It Have
Retroactive Application?, 12 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 591 (1984).
133. See Compton v. Ide, 732 F.2d 1429, 1433 (9th Cir. 1984) (three years);
Alexander v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 729 F.2d 576, 577 (8th Cir. 1984) (five years);
Nelson v. Chapman & Cutler, [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,808,
at 90,077 (N.D. Il1. July 12, 1984); Victoria Oil Co. v. Lancaster Corp., 587 F.
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alleged predicate acts, rather than to RICO itself, to determine the
most appropriate state limitations period. For instance, in Kirschner
v. Cable Tel Corp. ,14 investors brought an action against several
investment analysts and ten cable television companies."' The plain-
tiffs' civil RICO count alleged predicate acts of common law fraud
and fraud in the sale of securities. 3 6 Ruling on the defendants'
motion to dismiss the civil RICO claim, the court considered whether
the claim was time-barred.137 Because the limitations period had been
effectively tolled, the court did not reach the question whether a
state two-year or six-year statute of limitations applied. 3 ' However,
the court followed previous decisions on this issue'39 and determined
that when a civil RICO claim is based on predicate acts of wire
fraud, mail fraud or fraud in the sale of securities, the court should
apply the general limitations period for fraud actions, as the claim
Supp. 429, 431-32 (D. Colo. 1984) (three years); Teltronics Servs., Inc. v. Anaconda-
Ericsson, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 724, 733 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (three years); Burns v.
Ersek, 591 F. Supp. 837, 843 (D. Minn. 1984) (three years); Estee Lauder, Inc.,
v. Harco Graphics, Inc., No. 82 Civ. 8188 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1984) (available
Sept. 2, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (six years); Umstead v. Durham
Hosiery Mills, Inc.,, 578 F. Supp. 342, 347-48 (M.D.NC. 1984); Creamer v. General
Teamsters Local Union 326, 579 F. Supp. 1284,. 1289-90 (D. Del. 1984) (three
years); Seawell v. Miller Brewing Co., 576 F.. Supp. 424, 427 (M.D.N.C. 1983)
(three years); Kirschner v. Cable/Tel Corp., 576 F. Supp. 234, 241 (E.D. Pa. 1983);
Durante Bros. & Sons v. Flushing Nat'I Bank, No. 84-7221, slip op. at 1721 (2d
Cir. Feb. 5, 1985) (three years); Noland v. Gurley, 566 F. Supp. 210, 216 (D.
Colo. 1983) (three years); Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 564 F. Supp. 1347, 1353 (E.D.
Pa. 1983) (six years); D'Iorio v. Adonizio, 554 F. Supp. 222, 231-32 (M.D. Pa.
1982) (six years); Gilbert v. Bagley, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 99,483, at 96,795-96 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 17, 1982) (two years); State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 683-84 (N.D. Ind. 1982)
(six years); Willcutts v. Jefferson Trust & Says. Bank of Peoria, No. 84-2006 (C.D.
Ill. April 21, 1982) (available Sept. 2, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file)
(five years); Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 495 F. Supp. 1321, 1324
n.4 (E.D. La. 1980) (one year).
134. 576 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
135. Id. at 238.
136. Id. Plaintiffs had purchased interests in a business enterprise consisting of
ten cable television companies. Plaintiffs alleged that the owners of these companies
made a number of fraudulent representations in connection with the sale. Defendants
raised the statute of limitations as one defense to plaintiff's charges. Id.
137. Id. at 240-41.
138. Id. at 241. As the RICO allegation was based on fraud, the action did not
arise until the fraud was revealed or should have been revealed in the exercise of
due diligence. As the fraud was discovered Within two years of the date the complaint
was filed, the court did not have to choose which fraud statute should be applied.
Id.
139. See Eisenberg, 564 F. Supp. at 1354; D'Iorio, 554 F. Supp. at 232; State
Farm, 540 F. Supp. at 685.
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"depend[s] upon the existence of a scheme or artifice to defraud." '' 40
Similarly, Burns v. Ersek'4' involved a civil RICO complaint alleging
predicate acts of mail fraud and fraud in the sale of securities. 42
In deciding whether to apply the analogous state limitations period
for securities fraud or the provision for common law fraud, the
court, citing Kirschner13 and other cases,'" declined to apply the
general fraud provision, and instead applied the securities fraud
provision. 45 Although the court found that the predicate acts did
necessarily involve a scheme or artifice to defraud, the court looked
to the complaint and found that "securities fraud is the significant
predicate act." 146 Thus, the court applied the shorter three-year statute
of limitations to bar the plaintiff's RICO claim. 47
2. Uniformity Within Jurisdictions
Some courts have rejected the approach of applying the state
statute of limitations applicable to the predicate acts, reasoning that
this approach has the potential of permitting the application of
different limitations periods to civil RICO actions within the same
state. ' 8 Instead, they have chosen a uniform statute of limitations
to be applied in all civil RICO actions brought within their juris-
dictions. For instance, in Victoria Oil v. Lancaster Corp. 149 the
court rejected the Kirschner approach, 50 and instead applied the
rationale employed by the tenth circuit in section 1983's' ac-
140. Kirschner, 576 F. Supp. at 241.
141. 591 F. Supp. 837 (D. Minn. 1984).
142. Id. at 839.
143. 576 F. Supp. at 241; see supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
144. Eisenberg, 564 F. Supp. at 1354; D'Iorio, 554 F. Supp. at 232.
145. Burns, 591 F. Supp. at 845.
146. Id.
147. Id. The court applied Minnesota's three-year statute of limitations applicable
to securities fraud cases (see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80A.23, subd. 7 (West Supp.
1984)), and specifically rejected applying the six-year statute applicable to an action
based on common law fraud (see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.05, subd. 1(6) (West
Supp. 1984)). Burns, 591 F. Supp. at 845.
148. See Victoria Oil, 587 F. Supp. at 431-32; Teltronics, 587 F. Supp. at 733.
149. 587 F. Supp. 429 (D. Colo. 1984). Plaintiff was the assignee of an un-
successful participant in a federal oil and gas lottery. Defendants were the successors
in interest of an individual who had received an oil and gas lease through the
lottery. Plaintiff alleged that defendants' conduct constituted a violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, common law fraud, conspiracy to defraud and civil RICO.
Id. at 430.
150. See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
151. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
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tions12 The Victoria Oil court held that civil RICO claims brought
within its jurisdiction should have uniform limitations periods. 5 The
court specifically rejected an approach which would depend on the
individual predicate acts of the RICO claim and adopted a uniform
approach. 154 Courts are divided in their reaction to this approach. 5
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section,
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Id.
152. See Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct.
79 (1984). In Garcia, the Court of Appeals rejected their earlier practice of looking
to the specific facts of each action brought under Section 1983, to determine the
appropriate limitations period. Instead, the court adopted a "general characterization
for all civil rights claims." Id. at 649. The court reasoned that the uniform approach
"will ultimately best effectuate the purposes of both the civil rights acts and statutes
of limitations." Id.; accord Pauk v. Bd. of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982); Johnson v. Davis, 582 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir.
1978). 153. Victoria Oil, 587 F. Supp. at 431. The court noted that the civil RICO
claims are remedial in nature and that they present the same potential for factual
variety as do section 1983 actions. Id. However, once the predicate acts are
established, the remedy under the RICO statute depends solely on injury. Therefore,
the reasoning in Garcia "appears to apply to RICO claims as well." Id. The court
concluded that Colorado's residuary three-year statute of limitations should be
applied to all civil RICO claims brought within the state. See CoLo. REV. STAT.
§ 13-80-108(l)(b) (1973). In this case, the limitations period barred the RICO claim.
Victoria Oil, 587 F. Supp. at 432.
154. Id. at 431.
155. Compare Teltronics, 587 F. Supp. 724 (court applied three-year statute of
limitations) with Estee Lauder, No. 82 Civ. 8188 (court applied six-year statute of
limitations).
In Teltronics, the court specifically adopted the approach employed by the Second
Circuit in its consideration of section 1983 actions. This approach calls for the
uniform application of limitations periods to section 1983 actions within a juris-
diction. See Pauk, 654 F.2d at 863. The Teltronics court found that the same
policy considerations which were cited in section 1983 actions "apply with equal
force to RICO claims." Teltronics, 587 F. Supp. at 733. The court applied New
York's three-year statute to bar the RICO claim. Id.; see N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW
§ 214(2) (McKinney Supp. 1984-85).
In Estee Lauder, the court specifically rejected the analogy to section 1983 actions.
The court interpreted civil RICO as offering "new opportunities for enforcing
existing statutes." Estee Lauder, No. 82-8188. As such, it was distinct from section
1983 actions which represent "a wholly new form of liability." Id. In short, the
Estee Lauder court "accept[ed] the possibility of widely varying statutes of limitations
for actions brought under RICO." Id. The Estee Lauder court applied New York's
six-year statute of limitations for actions based on fraud to permit the RICO claim.
Id.; see N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 213(8) (McKinney Supp. 1984-85).
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3. The Federal Approach
One court, although following the general rule, 56 has suggested
that a better approach would be to apply the most analogous federal
statute of limitations.117 Arguably, such an approach would provide
even greater uniformity in civil RICO actions.' 58 Specifically, the
court in State Farm v. Estate of Caton, 59 although ultimately ap-
plying an analogous state statute of limitations, stated that "[tihe
better approach would seem to be to apply the nearest analogous
federal statute because it would promote predictability and uni-
formity. Such application would also avoid encumbering the remedial
purposes of RICO . . . on the question of which state statute of
limitations to apply." 16 The State Farm court, in reaching this
conclusion, relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Occidental
Life, '61 but conceded the uncertain effect of Occidental Life on civil
RICO actions. 162
In Gilbert v. Bagley,163 the court stressed the importance of char-
acterizing the civil RICO claim as a "federal cause of action" when
choosing the appropriate statute of limitations. 164 Concluding that
state courts have no interest in characterizing a civil RICO action,
when choosing the appropriate limitations period, a court should
do so "in light of the federal policy behind the RICO statute.' 1
65
Thus, the potential for inconsistencies in the application of statutes
156. See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
157. See State Farm, 540 F. Supp. at 684; see also Basic Concepts, supra note
10, at 1047; Commercial Litigation, supra note 10, at 937-38; Pleading Fraud,
supra note 10, at 107.
.158. State Farm, 540 F. Supp. at 684; see also Basic Concepts, supra note 10,
at 1047.
159. 540 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1982). In State Farm, plaintiff insurance
company brought a civil RICO action in connection with an allegedly fraudulent
insurance claim filed by defendants regarding the arson of a house. Id. at 675.
160. Id. at 684.
161. See supra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
162. State Farm, 540 F. Supp. at 684. Recently, in Durante Bros., the Second
Circuit followed the general rule and applied an analogous state limitations period.
No. 84-7221, slip op. at 1740. However, the court reasoned that when considering
a federal statutory cause of action which does not have an express limitations
period, like RICO, courts should look first to an analogous federal limitations
period. Id. at 1739-40. The Durante Bros. court could not find an "apparently
relevant federal statute of limitations," and thus applied an analogous state
limitations period. id.
163. [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,483, at 96,791
(M.D.N.C. Sept. 17, 1982). In Gilbert, the court considered a civil RICO claim
based on an alleged scheme to manipulate company stock prices.
164. Id. at 96,796.
165. Id.
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of limitations to civil RICO actions is manifest. 66 According to the
general Supreme Court rule, 6 7 a court would look to the predicate
acts comprising the civil RICO claim and apply the statute of
limitations of the most analogous state cause of action.168 As a review
of the case law has shown, this procedure requires the courts to
make a judgment on the appropriate limitations period to apply
based on the nature of the alleged predicate acts committed.
69
Consequently, there is little uniformity in the application of limi-
tations periods to civil RICO claims. 70 Although some courts have
specifically accepted this result,' 7' others have looked for a more
uniform approach.' 72 Differing limitations periods lead to incon-
sistent results, not only among federal courts around the country, 73
but even among federal district courts within an individual circuit.
74
Thus, although a claim might be timely in one jurisdiction, the same
claim might be stale in another. 75 A claimant would not be certain
whether or not his claim was timely or stale. 76 Moreover, the present
approach lends itself to potentially confusing and complex choice
of law and other legal disputes.'
166. See, e.g., Estee Lauder, No. 82-8188, where the court recognized and accepted
the potential that different limitations periods could be applied in civil RICO
actions, depending upon the specific facts of a case.
167. See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Burns v. Ersek, 591 F. Supp. 837, 845 (D. Minn. 1984); Kirschner
v. Cable/Tel Corp., 576 F. Supp. 234, 241 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Eisenberg v. Gagnon,
564 F. Supp. 1347, 1354 (E.D. Pa. 1983); D'Iorio v. Adonizio, 554 F. Supp. 222,
232 (M.D. Pa. 1982).
169. See supra notes 133-47 and accompanying text.
170. Courts deciding the application of statutes of limitations to civil RICO
actions have applied limitations periods ranging from one year to six years. See
supra note 133.
171. See Estee Lauder, No. 82-8188.
172. See supra notes 148-65 and accompanying text.
173. See, supra note 133.
174. Compare Teltronics, 587 F. Supp. at 733 (court for Eastern District of New
York applied three-year limitations period) with Estee Lauder, 82 Civ. 8188 (court
for Southern District of New York applied six-year limitations period).
175. Given the vast divergence of limitations periods applied in civil RICO actions
in the past five years (see generally note 133), a stale claim in one jurisdiction
would be a timely claim in another. Compare J. Ray McDermott, 495 F. Supp.
at 1324 n.4 (one year) with Eisenberg, 564 F. Supp. at 1354 (six years).
176. For instance, a civil RICO claim based on activity occurring in New York
City could be subject to a three-year limitations period (see Teltronics, 587 F. Supp.
724), or a six-year limitations period Teltronics, 587 F. Supp. 724), or a six-year
limitations period (see Estee Lauder, No. 82-8188).
177. The court in State Farm warned of the problems which the present approach
forebodes when it wrote, "it is foreseeable that a complex issue concerning a choice
of state law will arise where the operative facts occurred in a state other than the
forum state or a combination of states." 540 F. Supp. at 684; see also UAW v.
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V. Recommendation: Enactment of a Uniform Civil RICO
Statute of Limitations
Although some courts have recognized the inequities of the general
rule and have moved to establish a uniform limitations period for
civil RICO actions within their jurisdictions, 178 or have suggested
that the statute is federal in nature and that the better approach
would be to apply the nearest analogous federal statute, 179 a more
definite approach is needed. 80
Clearly, RICO is a federal statute with the distinctly federal purpose
of eliminating organized crime.'8 ' Congress' intent in enacting RICO
was to provide an additional remedy to supplement existing state
and federal provisions.' 82
In light of the real and potential inequities in the present
limitations scheme" 3 and of the federal character of RICO,'" Con-
Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 705 n.8 (1966). Other unsettled questions
which inevitably will be presented involve the situation in which the predicate acts
occur at one time, but the RICO injury occurs many years later. Should the limita-
tions period begin to run at the time of the commission of the final predicate act
and possibly bar a civil RICO claim prior to the RICO injury? Shall the limitations
period run from the occurrence of the RICO injury? Moreover, the present rule
permits a court, in its discretion, to utilize the statute of limitations to support
the judge's substantive view of civil RICO.
178. See supra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 156-65 and accompanying text.
180. See infra notes 201-07 and accompanying text.
181. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922,
923 (1970) (Statement of Findings and Purpose).
182. Id. See generally Pub. L. No. 91-452, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4007-91. The fact that RICO has a distinctly federal purpose is supported by the
fact that several states have enacted their own racketeering statutes. See, e.g., ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2301 to 13-2316 (1978 & West Supp. 1984-85); CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 186-186.8 (West Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-17-101 to 18-17-
109 (Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-393 to 53-403 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 895.01-895.08 (Harrison Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-14-1 to 16-14-15
(1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 842-1 to 842-12 (1976); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-
7801 to 18-7805 (Burns Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, §§ 1651-1660
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-30.5-1 to 34-4-30.5-6, 35-
45-6-1 to 35-45-6-2 (Burns Supp. 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:1351-1356
(West Supp. 1984); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 207.350-207.520 (West 1983); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 5:12-125 to 5:12-129 (West Supp. 1984-85); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-42-
1 to 30-42-6 (1980); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-06.1-01 to 12.1-06.1-08 (Supp. 1983);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 166.715-735 (1981); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 911 (Purdon
1983); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 25, §§ 971-971p (1979 & Supp. 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 7-15-1 to 7-15-11 (Supp. 1984); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 71.01-71.05 (Vernon
Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-10-1601 to 76-10-1608 (Supp. 1983); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 946.80-946.87 (West Supp. 1984-85).
183. See supra notes 166-77 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
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gress should enact an express statute of limitations.,85 Such a statute
would provide potential litigants with a uniform and predictable
approach which would result in a more equitable application of
RICO. 186
The clearest analogy may be found in criminal RICO'87 actions. 8
Courts considering statute of limitations issues in criminal RICO
actions, noting the absence of an express statute of limitations, 8 9
have uniformly applied the general five-year statute applicable to
federal criminal statutes. 90 This uniform application has brought
predictability to limitations problems in criminal RICO actions. 9'
For instance, in United States v. Forsythe,192 the court held that
federal law, not state law, governed the period of limitations ap-
plicable to criminal RICO actions. 93 Specifically, given the absence
185. For instance, in the area of antitrust law, Congress has enacted an express
four-year statute of limitations.
Any action to enforce any cause of action under sections 15, 15a, or
15c or this title shall be forever barred unless commenced within four
years after the cause of action accrued. No cause of action barred under
existing law on the effective date of this Act shall be revived by this
Act.
15 U.S.C. § 15b (1976).
Prior to the enactment of 15 U.S.C. § 15b, courts had looked to an analogous
state action and applied its limitations period. Compare Englander Motors, Inc.
v. Ford Motor Co., 293 F.2d 802 (6th Cir. 1961) (six-year state limitations period
applied) with North Carolina Theaters, Inc. v. Thompson, 277 F.2d 673 (4th Cir.
1960) (one-year state limitations period applied). The enactment of 15 U.S.C. §
l5b provides that all actions brought under the antitrust statutes will be governed
by a uniform four-year limitations period.
186. A single federal statute of limitations for RICO will combine 1) the benefits
of those courts applying uniform state limitations periods to all RICO claims within
their jurisdiction (see supra notes 148-55 and accompanying text) and 2) the federal
nature of RICO (see supra notes 156-65 and accompanying text).
187. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982). For the text of this statute, see supra note 3.
188. See, e.g., United States v. Licavoli, 725 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 3535 (1984); United States v. Bethea, 672 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Boffa,
513 F. Supp. 444 (D. Del. 1980); United States v. Mazzio, 501 F. Supp. 340 (E.D.
Pa. 1980), aff'd, 681 F.2d 810 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1134 (1982).
189. Bethea, 672 F.2d at 419; Boffa, 513 F. Supp. at 479.
190. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1982). Section 3282 provides: "Except as otherwise
expressly provided by law, no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for
any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the information is
instituted within five years next after such offense shall have been committed."
Id.
191. Unlike civil RICO actions decided to date, where the applicable statute of
limitations may and do differ, in criminal RICO cases courts consistently have
applied the general five-year statute of limitations. See supra note 188.
192. 560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977).
193. Id. at 1134.
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of an express statute of limitations in RICO, the court should apply
the five-year general criminal statute of limitations to criminal RICO
actions.194 The statute begins to run at the commission of the final
predicate act which constitutes the RICO violation.' 95 Therefore, at
trial, a jury must find that at least one of the predicate acts occurred
within five years of the date of the indictment.196 It is irrelevant
that the state limitations period for the state crime chargeable as a
predicate offense had run, because federal law controls. 97 "The
reference to state law in the [RICO] statute is simply to define the
wrongful conduct, and is not meant to incorporate state procedural
law." 98 In short, in criminal RICO cases, the state statute of lim-
itations is "simply irrelevant."'' 99 Furthermore, RICO was designed
not to eradicate predicate state violations, but rather "to punish the
impact on commerce caused by conduct which meets the statute's
definition of racketeering activity.'"'
Congress should enact a uniform statute of limitations for civil
RICO actions.20 A uniform statute of limitations, like the five-year
statute applied in criminal cases, would best protect the interests of
the litigants2"2 as well as provide predictability in civil RICO cases.2"3
If Congress fails to adopt such a limitations provision, courts should
consider those cases which have applied the exception to the Supreme
Court rule. 204 In light of these cases, courts should not hesitate to
look to the federal provision applied in criminal RICO cases, 205
194. Id.
195. Bethea, 672 F.2d at 419. "The statute of limitations runs from the date
of the last act of racketeering activity alleged in the indictment and proved at
trial." Id.
196. Id.
197. See Licavoli, 725 F.2d at 1046-47.
198. Id. at 1047.199. Mazzio, 501 F. Supp. at 343.
200. Forsythe, 560 F.2d at 1135; see also Boffa, 513 F. Supp. at 479.
201. See Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial Re-
striction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1101 (1982).
202. Consequently, the general purpose of statutes of limitations would be best
fulfilled. That is, limitations periods are enforced in order to protect the litigants
and to prevent any impairment of "the accuracy of the factfinding process." Board
of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980).
203. The same uniform approach which applies to criminal RICO would prevent
the present inconsistencies and potentially confusing legal problems. See supra notes
166-77.
204. See supra notes 117-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases
which have adopted the exception to the Supreme Court rule and have applied an
analogous federal limitations period.
205. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1982). See supra note 190 for text of this statute.
CIVIL RICO
which is consistent with RICO's legislative purpose,2 °6 and apply it
to civil RICO actions. 207
VI. Conclusion
This Note has examined RICO and its history, emphasizing actions
seeking RICO's civil remedies. This Note has explored RICO's prob-
lems and has stressed the inequities which surround courts' present
applications of limitations provisions to civil RICO actions. To avoid
these inequities, a uniform statute of limitations for civil RICO
claims should be adopted to provide needed uniformity and pre-
dictability.
Michael J. Lane
206. See supra notes 42-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of RICO's
legislative history.
207. The adoption of the statute of limitations applied in criminal RICO actions
would lend the same uniformity to civil RICO actions which criminal RICO actions
now possess. See generally supra notes 188-200 and accompanying text for a
discussion of criminal RICO cases which have uniformly applied a five-year statute
of limitations.
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